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CONFLICT, CONSENSUS  
& CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING: THE 
ENDURING LEGACY OF CHARLES BEARD 
Saul Cornell* 
Few books in American history have had as profound an 
impact on scholarly debate as Charles Beard’s An Economic 
Interpretation of the Constitution.1 Beard not only shaped the 
terms of historical debate for much of the twentieth century, his 
emphasis on the contested nature of politics and constitutionalism 
in the Founding continues to influence historical scholarship.2 
Although orthodox Beardianism is rare today, historical 
scholarship has embraced a form of soft Beardianism. Most 
historians accept that the Founding era was deeply divided over 
constitutional ideas and most also accept that socio-economic 
tensions contributed to this divisiveness. The contrast with legal 
scholarship could hardly be starker: legal scholarship on the 
Constitution has generally neglected Beard.3 Among legal 
* Paul and Diane Guenther Chair in American History, Fordham University. 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a series of conferences commemorating 
the Beard Centennial at the Rothmere Center, Oxford University, the University of 
Virginia Law School and Miller Center, University of Virginia, and the American Society 
of Legal History Annual Conference, Miami, Florida, 2013. I would like to thank the 
participants at these conferences for useful suggestions. The revisions of this paper 
especially benefited from conversations with Max Edling, Gary Gerstle, Peter Thompson, 
Woody Holton, Jack Rakove, and Calvin Johnson at Oxford; Mark Graber, Jessica Lowe, 
Ted White, and Adrian Vermule at UVA; David Konig, David Rabban, Richard 
Bernstein, Gerry Leonard, Aaron Knapp, and Allison Lacroix at ASLH. Valuable 
research assistance was provided by Nathalie Verhaegen. Finally I would like to thank Jill 
Hasday and the staff of Constitutional Commentary for editorial advice and assistance. 
 1. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES (1913). On Beard’s impact on subsequent historical scholarship, 
see Max Edling, Introduction to the Centennial Symposium on Charles Beard’s Economic 
Interpretation, 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 259 (2013). 
 2. For a measured assessment of the differences between modern historiography 
and Beard that acknowledges his profound influence, see Eric Slauter, Beard’s “Politics,” 
Ours, and Theirs, 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 283 (2013). 
 3. A Lexis search of the terms “Beard” and “An Economic Interpretation” yields 
only 202 hits between 1983 and 2013. If one eliminates historians writing in law reviews the 
number would be even lower. By comparison a JSTOR search for the same period yields 
2648 hits. Not surprisingly, Beard’s reputation has fared better among scholars working 
with or in the critical legal studies tradition; see Mark Tushnet, The Constitution as an 
383 
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scholars, originalists have been the group most resistant to 
recognizing the importance of Beard’s basic insight into Founding 
era constitutionalism. Rather than acknowledge the raucous and 
often cacophonous nature of the public debate over the 
Constitution’s original meaning, originalists have conjured a false 
historical past marked by consensus.4 
Constitutional ideas are not disembodied abstractions 
floating in some type of constitutional ether.5 Recovering the 
historical meaning of a text involves identifying the 
communicative intent of its author and understanding the myriad 
ways different readers and groups of readers would have 
interpreted a particular author’s words.6 In all but the simplest 
cases, deciding which of those original understandings ought to be 
given legal effect is not a neutral choice, but a political or 
philosophical one. The best any originalist theory could ever hope 
to accomplish would be to allow us to pick sides in the Founding 
era’s own constitutional debates.7 
Many originalists have treated meaning as if it were 
objective, but this is clearly a mistake.8 Meaning is not objective, 
but the public nature of meaning renders it inter-subjective.9 
Recovering the meaning of the Constitution requires moving 
beyond the text and the words on the page to reconstructing the 
Economic Document: Beard Revisited, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 106 (1987). Legal 
historians teaching at law schools have also had a more serious engagement with Beard’s 
materialist approach; for an excellent example, see G. Edward White, The Political 
Economy of the Original Constitution, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61 (2012). 
 4. Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 1539 (2005) (arguing that the people were silent bystanders to American 
constitutional development); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original 
Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009) (arguing that ordinary Americans defer to lawyers on 
questions of constitutional meaning). See also discussion infra pp. 402–03. 
 5. See generally James T. Kloppenberg, Thinking Historically: A Manifesto of 
Pragmatic Hermeneutics, 9 MODERN INTELL. HIST. 201 (2012); Saul Cornell, Meaning and 
Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to 
Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (2013). 
 6. A.P. Martinich, Four Senses of “Meaning” in the History of Ideas: Quentin 
Skinner’s Theory of Historical Interpretation, 3 J. PHIL. HIST. 225 (2009) and A .P. 
Martinich, A Moderate Logic of the History of Ideas, 73 J. HIST. IDEAS 609 (2012). 
 7. Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 387 (2003). 
 8. On the inter-subjective nature of meaning, see Quentin Skinner, Motives, 
Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts, 3 NEW LITERARY HIST. 393 (1972). For an 
example of originalists who argue in favor of the idea of objective meaning, see Randy E. 
Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011) and 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, How To Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE 
L. J. 2037, 2059 (2006). 
 9.  QUENTIN SKINNER, Interpretation and the Understanding of Speech Acts, in 
VISIONS OF POLITICS: VOLUME 1: REGARDING METHOD 103 (2002).  
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contextual factors which would have been used by listeners and 
readers to make sense of an author’s words. Originalists have 
generally treated the people as if they were mute bystanders to 
the great constitutional drama unfolding in 1788.10 Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists were not homogenous modern style parties, but 
loose coalitions who were often held together by little more than 
a few commonly shared texts and a general predisposition to 
support or oppose ratification. The existence of a common 
language did not always signal deeper commitment to the same 
legal and constitutional ideals. The meaning of a phrase such as 
“the right to bear arms” meant one thing to Daniel Shays and 
quite another to James Madison.11 To understand the dynamics of 
the original debate over constitutional meaning one must pay 
attention to the familiar voices of the Founding era’s elites and 
the less familiar voices of ordinary Americans. The time has 
arrived for a new constitutional historicism, a scholarly approach 
that would unite the top down focus of traditional constitutional 
history with a bottom up approach informed by an appreciation 
of Beard’s basic insight into the contested nature of early 
American constitutionalism.12 
The approach sketched above is consistent with recent work 
in the philosophy of language.13 Few of the Constitution’s open 
ended provisions, the ones most likely to spawn controversy 
today, are likely to yield a single uncontested meaning when 
subjected to a rigorous historical analysis.14 The dominant 
paradigm among originalists, public meaning originalism, is based 
on an overly simplistic view of history and a flawed understanding 
of the philosophy of language. 15 Public meaning originalism treats 
the task of recovering original meaning as if it were akin to 
running the Constitution’s text through something like a Google 
 10. Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular 
Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 
324 (2011). 
 11. SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS 
AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006). 
 12. Cornell, supra note 5, at 721; D. Alan Orr, A Prospectus for a “New” 
Constitutional History of Early Modern England, 36 ALBION 430, 448 (2004). 
 13. Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO JURIS 423 (2008). 
 14. On the need to recognize the contested meanings of various constitutional 
provisions, see Bernadette Meyler, Accepting Contested Meanings, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
803 (2013). 
 15. Scott Soames, Toward a Theory of Legal Interpretation, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 
231, 232 (2011); Andrei Marmor, Can the Law Imply More Than It Says? On Some 
Pragmatic Aspects of Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE 
IN THE LAW 83, 97 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011).  
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translator function set to 1788 American English.16 The meaning 
of any text depends as much on the background assumptions 
against which the text was originally read as it does the dictionary 
meaning of the words in the text.17 Understanding the pragmatics 
of communication is at least as important as, if not more so than, 
the semantic content of the text.18 
FRAMERS, RATIFIERS, AND THE PROBLEM OF  
ANTI-FEDERALISM 
Beard’s study was an ambitious effort to understand the 
origins of the Constitution in materialist terms. Although not a 
Marxist, Beard’s progressive vision, rooting politics in the clash of 
economic interests, has influenced historical debate for nearly a 
century.19 Two claims made by Beard have generated a lively 
inter-generational debate about the Constitution. Beard’s 
primary claim that decisions within the Philadelphia Convention 
were motivated by the economic interests of the delegates has 
been attacked by many, but nonetheless continues to have 
supporters, mostly notably among quantitative economic 
historians.20 Many historians would concede that economic 
interests played some role in the Convention’s deliberations, but 
few would embrace Beard’s brand of economic determinism.21 Far 
less scholarly attention has been devoted to the other aspect of 
Beard’s theory, his elaboration of Orrin Grant Libby’s analysis of 
the geographical distribution of the vote on ratification.22 In 
contrast to Beard, Libby is not a name many modern scholars 
 16. Dictionaries figure prominently in much new originalist analysis. See Lawrence 
B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 925—
26 (2009). In more recent writing Solum has given greater attention to forms of pragmatic 
enrichment, but this aspect of the theory is still radically under theorized, Lawrence B. 
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 459 
(2013). For a critique of the use of dictionaries and other problems with Solum’s emphasis 
on semantics over pragmatics, see Cornell, supra note 5. 
 17. Cornell, supra note 5. 
 18. Marmor, supra note 13. 
 19. For other examples of Beard’s influence on the American historical profession, 
see PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE OBJECTIVITY QUESTION AND THE 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 104, 240, 410 (1988). 
 20. Economic historians have been the most sympathetic to Beard’s project. See 
ROBERT A. MCGUIRE, TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: A NEW ECONOMIC 
INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 16 (2003). 
 21. For two recent statements typical of historical attitudes, see Seth Cotlar, The 
View from Mount Vernon versus the People Out of Doors: Context and Conflict in the 
Ratification Debates, 69 WM. & MARY Q. 369, 371 (2012), and Todd Estes, Power and 
Point of View in the Ratification Contest, 69 WM. & MARY Q. 398, 400 (2012). 
 22. ORIN GRANT LIBBY, THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE VOTE OF THE 
THIRTEEN STATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788 (1894).  
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readily recognize. Elaborating Libby’s argument, Beard claimed 
that Anti-Federalism drew its greatest numerical strength from 
back country regions, areas in which debt-ridden farmers sought 
pro-inflationary economic policies. Not only has this insight been 
widely embraced by many historians, it has achieved an almost 
canonical status in American history textbooks.23 In his classic 
work on the Constitution Beard observed that “[t]he opposition 
to the Constitution almost uniformly came from the agricultural 
regions, and from the areas in which debtors had been 
formulating paper money and other depreciatory schemes.”24 It is 
this soft version of Beardianism that has come to dominate 
historical scholarship. Subsequent scholarship has refined this 
basic insight in a number of important ways. Neo-Progressive 
historians, most significantly, Jackson Turner Main, argued that 
the Constitution pit commercially oriented farmers and 
merchants against champions of a more radical localist agrarian 
tradition.25 Building on neo-Progressive scholarship a new 
generation of social historians elaborated this approach, 
illuminating the ideologies of farmers, artisans, slaves, and 
women.26 Inspired by the rise of cultural history, more recent 
scholarship on the Founding era has focused on political culture, 
analyzing parades, crowd actions, and the dynamics of the 
emerging public sphere of print culture in the new republic.27 
Finally, neo-Beardians, Woody Holton and Terry Bouton have 
refocused attention on the role of debtor politics in early 
American history.28 
 23. The best indication of Beard’s influence is the account of ratification in standard 
freshmen level college textbooks; see ALLAN BRINKLEY, Chapter 6: The Constitution and 
the New Republic, Where Historians Disagree, in AMERICAN HISTORY: A SURVEY (13th 
ed. 2008). 
 24. BEARD, supra note 1, at 291. 
 25. JACKSON TURNER MAIN, POLITICAL PARTIES BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION 
(1973). 
 26. ALFRED F. YOUNG, LIBERTY TREE: ORDINARY PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (2006); REVOLUTIONARY FOUNDERS: REBELS, RADICALS, AND 
REFORMERS IN THE MAKING OF THE NATION (Alfred Young et al. eds., 2011). 
 27.  DAVID WALDSTREICHER, IN THE MIDST OF PERPETUAL FETES: THE MAKING 
OF AMERICAN NATIONALISM, 1776-1820 (1997); BEYOND THE FOUNDERS: NEW 
APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
(Jeffrey L. Pasley et al. eds., 2004). 
 28. TERRY BOUTON, TAMING DEMOCRACY: “THE PEOPLE,” THE FOUNDERS, AND 
THE TROUBLED ENDING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2007); WOODY HOLTON, 
UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 14 (2007); MARJOLEINE 
KARS, BREAKING LOOSE TOGETHER: THE REGULATOR REBELLION IN PRE-
REVOLUTIONARY NORTH CAROLINA (2002) constitute a “Duke School” of revolutionary 
historiography that has a strong Beardian strain. The Duke School reflects the social 
history vision of historian Peter Wood, who shaped the early American history graduate 
program. On Wood’s historical sensibility, see Peter Wood, “I Did the Best I Could for My  
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One of the most important alternative historical paradigms 
to the one sketched above is associated with the work of Bernard 
Bailyn and his students.29 Pauline Maier and Jack Rakove, in 
particular, elaborated the intellectual and political forces shaping 
the Constitution and ratification. Neither Maier nor Rakove was 
much influenced by Beard, but one can detect a subtle Beardian 
influence in another student of Bailyn, Gordon S. Wood.30 In The 
Creation of the American Republic, Wood cast the Anti-
Federalists as populist democrats. He drew a vital distinction 
between the Anti-Federalist elite and ordinary Anti-Federalists.31 
Wood conceded that “such ‘aristocrats’ as [Richard Henry] Lee 
or [George] Mason did not truly represent Anti-Federalism.”32 
Although Woody Holton and Gordon Wood represent two 
opposing poles of the contemporary historiographical spectrum, 
both scholars argue that elite Anti-Federalist figures such as 
George Mason tell us little about the motivations and beliefs of 
popular opposition to the Constitution.33 The relationship 
between elite and popular thought was actually far more fluid and 
dynamic than either of these accounts acknowledges. 
Constitutional ideas flowed in both directions, percolating down 
from elites and bubbling up from below.34 
MASON’S OBJECTIONS AND THE DISSENT OF THE 
MINORITY: A TALE OF TWO TEXTS 
In both Pennsylvania and New York Anti-Federalism was 
dominated by middling democrat radicals. The American 
Day”: The Study of Early Black History during the Second Reconstruction, 1960 to 1976, 
35 WM. & MARY Q. 185 (1978) and Peter H. Wood, One Nation-One Semester: High-
Altitude Flights across American History, 8 COMMON-PLACE 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.common-place.org/vol-08/no-02/author/. 
 29. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (rev. ed., 1967); PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE 
THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788 121 (2010); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: 
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1997). 
 30. Ironically, Straussian political scientists have treated Wood as if he were doing 
social history, not intellectual history, see Murray Dry, The Debate Over Ratification of the 
Constitution, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Jack P. 
Greene & J.R. Pole eds., 2003). For an interesting debate over Wood’s Beardianism, see 
Shlomo Slonim, Forum: The Founders and the States: Motives at Philadelphia, 1787: 
Gordon Wood’s Neo-Beardian Thesis Reexamined, 16 LAW & HIS. REV. 527, 527 (1998). 
 31. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 
(1998). 
 32. Id. at 485. 
 33. HOLTON, supra note 28, at 235 (2008). 
 34. SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE 
DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828 (1999).  
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Revolution had turned out the traditional elites and opened up 
politics to a new type of popular politician. Farmers and artisans 
from the ranks of the industrious middling sorts dominated 
politics in both states.35 Although he may have been a planter 
aristocrat, George Mason’s influence on popular Anti-Federalist 
thought should not be under estimated. Middling radicals in 
Pennsylvania and New York eagerly sought out Mason’s 
Objections to the Constitution.36 A manuscript copy of Mason’s 
text circulated widely among Anti-Federalists in these regions 
prior to its publication.37 Robert Whitehill, an important 
backcountry spokesman from Pennsylvania, consulted Mason’s 
Objections before preparing the list of Amendments to the 
Constitution he introduced toward the end of the Pennsylvania 
ratification convention. Whitehill’s proposals echoed some 
elements of Mason’s arguments, but there were important 
differences between the two documents. One of the most striking 
differences between Mason’s text and Whitehill’s was the 
treatment of the militia and the right to bear arms. Mason’s text 
echoed the language of the Virginia Declaration of Rights.38 It 
attacked the power to raise a standing army, but did not expressly 
affirm a right to bear arms.39 Whitehill’s list of Amendments 
combined together two separate rights protected in the 1776 
Pennsylvania Constitution, a right to bear arms and a right to 
hunt. These separate rights were now presented as a single 
provision. The Federalist majority in Pennsylvania rejected 
demands that Whitehill’s Amendments be included in the official 
convention proceedings. Believing that it was vital to get the word 
out about these proposed amendments Anti-Federalists rushed 
 35. EDWARD COUNTRYMAN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (rev. ed. 2003). 
 36. CORNELL, supra note 34, at 74–75 (1999). 
 37. In the fall of 1787 George Mason traveled to Pennsylvania to help coordinate 
further opposition to the Constitution. New York’s Charles Tillinghast reported that 
Mason traveled through the Pennsylvania back-country “haranguing the Inhabitants, and 
pointing out the dangerous effects or consequences which would inevitably flow from the 
New Constitution.” A manuscript copy of Mason’s Objections to the Constitution had 
begun to circulate among Anti-Federalists in the middle Atlantic. New York Anti-
Federalist John Lamb read a manuscript copy of Mason’s Objections at George Clinton’s 
home and concluded that Mason was a “Man of the first rate Understanding,” Charles 
Tillinghast to Hugh Hughes October 12, 1787, 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 373 (John. P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1976) 
[hereinafter] DHRC at 13:373. 
 38. SAUL CORNELL, A WELL REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND 
THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA, 20 (2006). 
 39. George Mason Virginia Declaration of Rights, 12 June 1776, in THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE MASON 287–89 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970); George Mason, “Objections to 
the Constitution of Government formed by the Convention, (1787) reprinted in 2 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 13 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 2007).  
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them into print. The task of embedding this list in a coherent 
statement of Anti-Federalist principles fell to Samuel Bryan, the 
son of a popular Anti-Federalist politician, George Bryan.40 
Whitehill’s amendments and Bryan’s critique were published 
together as The Dissent of the Anti-Federalist Minority of 
Pennsylvania. The text was signed by the minority Anti-Federalist 
delegates to the state convention and was widely reprinted both 
in papers and as a pamphlet.41 
Historians and originalist scholars have each cited the 
Dissent, which has enjoyed a remarkable life after death, 
becoming a central text in the contentious modern debate over 
the meaning of the Second Amendment. The treatment of this 
text by historians and orginalists is so radically different that one 
might be tempted to conclude that the two scholarly communities 
must be talking about separate documents.42 Understanding how 
historians and originalists have interpreted this text cuts to the 
very core of the difference between a genuinely historical 
approach and the pseudo-historical approach favored by 
originalists.43 Historians remain committed to discovering 
communicative intent and where relevant to exploring the diverse 
contested readings of elite and popular texts. Originalists by 
contrast have largely abandoned the search for intent, rejected the 
contested nature of Founding era constitutionalism, and generally 
ignored the role of popular constitutional ideas. In place of a focus 
on actual readers, originalists have substituted imaginary readers 
who invariably tend to share the ideological biases and 
assumptions of modern originalists.44 
For most historians unraveling the original meaning of any 
text, including the Dissent of the Pennsylvania Minority, requires 
paying attention to the whole text, not a single passage ripped out 
of context. One must understand the document’s complicated 
publication history, including its distribution, and, where possible, 
patterns of reader response to the text.45 Originalists have not only 
ignored all of these contexts, but they have conjured up a topsy-
turvy world in which the Dissent of the Minority is miraculously 
 40. 2 DHRC at 617–45. 
 41. 15 DHRC at 7–13. 
 42. Kevin M. Sweeney, Firearms, Militias, and the Second Amendment, in THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. 
HELLER 310 (Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich eds., 2013). 
 43. CORNELL, supra note 34, at 158; Paul Finkelman, “A Well-Regulated Militia”: The 
Second Amendment in Historical Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 196–97 (2000). 
 44. See discussion, infra pp. 402–05. 
 45. Cornell, supra note 5.  
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transformed into a text illustrating the Assent of the Majority. In 
this sense originalism produces a fun-house mirror effect in which 
the constituent parts of the past are reflected back in grotesquely 
distorted fashion. Nothing better captures this fun-house mirror 
world than Randy Barnett’s claim about the meaning of this text.46 
In Barnett’s view “[t]he fact that this particular sentiment was 
held by a minority of delegates tells us next to nothing about 
whether it reflects the common view among Pennsylvanians at 
large.” Before making such a bold claim one might have expected 
Barnett to have researched the history of this text, including its 
composition, distribution, and something about contemporary 
reactions to its argument. Such information is not only absent 
from his analysis, but is largely irrelevant to originalist practice.47 
Justice Scalia cited Barnett’s bizarre claims in Heller, using his 
distorted account to buttress his own dubious interpretation of the 
“highly influential minority proposal in Pennsylvania,” which he 
noted “plainly referred to an individual right.”48 Using their 
originalist philosophers’ stone, Barnett and Scalia are able to 
magically transmute the base metal of the Dissent into originalist 
gold. A text illustrating a radical minority voice becomes a proxy 
for how the typical reasonable and competent user of English 
would have understood the term “bear arms.”49 
 46. On this point, see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 590; Kramer, supra 
note 7; Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in 
an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 246–48 (2004) (reviewing H. RICHARD 
UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, OR, 
HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002)). To support this strange contention 
Barnett cites the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution and 1790 Constitution. The argument 
that the 1776 Constitution affirms an individual right relies entirely on evidence about the 
1790 Constitution, which completely rewrote the provision. Arguments such as these 
represent a form of constitutional bait and switch. Barnett also claims that the 1790 arms 
bearing provision and the Pennsylvania Dissent use the “same phraseology.” Actually, it 
would be more accurate to say the two texts are almost completely different apart from 
the single common phrase “bear arms in defense of themselves.” The 1790 constitutional 
text detached the prohibition on standing armies and affirmation of civilian control of the 
militia from the provision affirming a right to bear arms; see Kozuskanich, infra note 63. 
 47. Barnett’s claim was made in the context of attacking Richard Uviller and William 
Merkel for failing to provide adequate support for treating the text as a minority voice, see 
Barnett, supra note 46, at 247. Of course, Uviller and Merkel’s claim so closely tracked the 
established historiography, Barnett’s skepticism seems hard to justify on scholarly 
grounds, see Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 
76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103 (2000) and Finkelman, supra note, 43 at 196–97. 
 48. Heller, 554 U.S. at 604. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original 
Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 226–27 (1983); David B. Kopel, 
The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1505–06 
(1998). 
 49. Heller, 554 U.S. at 604.  
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The first step in arriving at a genuinely historical 
understanding of Whitehill’s amendments, and the Dissent, must 
recognize the way both texts fused together two rights treated 
separately in the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution. In addition to 
Pennsylvania being the first state to single out the right to bear 
arms for explicit protection, Pennsylvania’s 1776 Constitution also 
expressly protected a right to hunt.50 Entrenchment of hunting 
rights was highly unusual in 1776.51 Similarly, such a right was 
rarely mentioned in the debates around the Constitution in 1788 
and the Bill of Rights in 1791.52 Although there were numerous 
complaints about the threat to the militia aired during ratification, 
the subject of hunting was seldom mentioned. Nor was the right 
of individual self-defense much discussed.53 The absence of any 
discussion of these rights does not mean that Americans did not 
value these rights. Here one must move beyond the four corners 
of the text and identify the background assumptions informing the 
public debate over the Constitution.54 Originalists have generally 
ignored such assumptions or anachronistically reasoned 
backward from modern legal assumptions alien to Founding era 
legal culture.55 Not every right protected at common law was 
 50. Edward Dumbauld, An Unusual Constitutional Claim, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 229 
(1957). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Donald S. Lutz, The State Constitutional Pedigree of the U.S. Bill of Rights, 22 
PUBLIUS 19 (1992). 
 53. Rakove, supra note 47. 
 54. Cornell, supra note 5. 
 55. For a good example of the centrality of anachronism to originalism, see Nicholas 
J. Johnson, Rights Versus Duties, History Department Lawyering, and the Incoherence of 
Justice Stevens’s Heller Dissent, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J.1503 (2012). Johnson argues that 
the Second Amendment could not have been a right to bear arms in a militia because 
modern rights are generally understood to provide strong claims against the state and do 
not impose obligations on citizens. Johnson is certainly correct that this is the orthodox 
view of modern rights. What is more remarkable is his assumption that this must have been 
the case in the Founding era, particularly when there is a significant body of scholarship 
arguing the opposite view. Compare Johnson’s patently ahistorical claims with JOHN 
PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE 
AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS, 184 (1986); James H. Hutson, The Bill of Rights and the American 
Revolutionary Experience, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN 
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND LAW—1791 AND 1991, 62, 87 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud 
Haakonssen eds., 1993); RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN 
AND DEVELOPMENT (1979). Rights and duties are not only correlative in early modern 
legal theory and political philosophy, but statements of rights often expressly link the 
exercise of a specific right with a particular obligation. The Virginia Declaration of Rights 
illustrates this point nicely: “That Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and 
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force 
or violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, 
according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice 
Christian forbearance, love, and charity, towards each other,” 12 June 1776, Mason Papers 
1:287–89.  
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singled out for express protection in 1776 or 1788.56 There was 
broad agreement among Federalists and Anti-Federalists that 
matters of criminal law, including the meaning and scope of the 
traditional common law right of self-defense, would be addressed 
by the individual states, not the new Federal government. 
Federalist Tench Coxe wrote that “[t]he states will regulate and 
administer the criminal law, exclusively of Congress.” The police 
power of the states would not be diminished under the new 
Constitution and the individual states would continue to legislate 
on all matters “such as unlicensed public houses, nuisances, and 
many other things of the like nature.”57 Brutus, one of the most 
eloquent Anti-Federalist authors, made much the same point. 
“[I]t ought to be left to the state governments to provide for the 
protection and defence of the citizen against the hand of private 
violence, and the wrongs done or attempted by individuals to each 
other.”58 
The Dissent’s linkage of the right to bear arms and hunting 
was not copied by any state ratification convention, nor was its 
language emulated by any other essayist during ratification.59 
Shortly after ratification ended, Whitehill and other backcountry 
Anti-Federalists gathered in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania to 
coordinate their strategy for Amendments. Many of the signers of 
the Dissent attended the meeting, but the list of Amendments 
produced at this meeting focused squarely on the danger of 
standing armies and threats to the state militias.60 Whitehill’s more 
individualistic language about arms bearing was not adopted by 
the Harrisburg Convention. Still, buoyed by Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists vigorously campaigned for seats in 
the First Federal Congress. Despite such efforts Anti-Federalists 
were resoundingly defeated. Pennsylvania’s first Congressional 
delegation included no Anti-Federalists.61 
 56. JACK N. RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 
(1998). 
 57. Tench Coxe, A Freeman, PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 30, 1788, reprinted in FRIENDS OF 
THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS 95 (Colleen A. Sheehan 
& Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998). 
 58. Brutus, Essays of Brutus VII, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 401 
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
 59.  For a discussion of the debate over this question, see Nathan Kozuskanich, 
Originalism in a Digital Age: An Inquiry into the Right to Bear Arms, in THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT ON TRIAL, supra note 42. 
 60. CORNELL, supra note 34, at 225. For the list of amendments proposed at 
Harrisburg, see INDEPENDENT JOURNAL, September 17, 1788. 
 61. Jack N. Rakove, supra note 47. As Rakove notes, “[i]f Americans had indeed 
been concerned with the impact of the Constitution on this right, and addressed the subject 
directly, the proponents of the individual right theory would not have to recycle the same  
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There is no evidence that Madison consulted the Dissent’s 
text when preparing his own list of Amendments for Congress. 
Whitehill’s list was not approved by the Pennsylvania ratification 
convention and was not published as part of the official 
proceedings. Thus, when all of the amendments recommended by 
the individual states were gathered together and published as a 
pamphlet the Dissent was not included. When Madison compiled 
his potential list of Amendments for Congress, Whitehill’s list was 
not in this collection.62 The claim that the Dissent had any 
influence on the framing of the Second Amendment is an 
invention of modern gun rights advocates and has no foundation 
in historical reality.63 
Originalists have all assumed that the Dissent serves as 
evidence for what a reasonable speaker of English would have 
thought in 1788. This claim also rests on a serious historical error. 
It would be more accurate to describe the Dissent as 
representative of one of the more important, but decidedly radical 
Anti-Federalist voices from 1788.64 Thomas Hartley, a Federalist 
member of the Pennsylvania state ratification convention, 
described the Dissent as a publication intended “to inflame” 
people’s minds. Its appeal was to emotion, not reason.65 In 
Massachusetts, Federalist Henry Van Schaack echoed this view; 
the Dissent was “purely calculated to inflame.”66 Samuel Bryan, 
the Dissent’s author, bragged that its language alarmed 
Federalists. In short, most contemporaries recognized Bryan’s 
gifts as a polemicist and propagandist for the Anti-Federalists, but 
few saw his text as a model of calm deliberate reason. The 
recognition of the Dissent’s radicalism did not lessen with the 
passage of time. When Pennsylvania’s Frederick Muhlenberg 
handful of references to the dissenters in the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention.” Id. 
at 109. Finkelman, supra note 43, at 196–97; Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning Of 
Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian Critique, 67 MD. L. REV. 150, 159 (2008). 
 62. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, Vol. 1, Chap. 14, Document 47; Hutson, supra note 55 at 62, 
87. 
 63. It is possible that by 1788, Pennsylvanians had come to see the two separate rights 
as indissolubly linked together, but is also possible that their juxtaposition in the text was 
simply an artifact of the text’s hasty composition. For an exploration of this text, see 
Nathan Kozuskanich, Defending Themselves: The Original Understanding of the Right to 
Bear Arms, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1041 (2007). 
 64. Heller, supra note 48. 
 65. 15 DHRC 12. The DHRC editors’ headnote provides a wealth of information 
about contemporary reactions to the Dissent. Originalists generally pay little attention to 
such vital contextual information resulting in a distorted account of the relative influence 
and importance of the sources they cite. 
 66. Id.  
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measured the debate in Congress over Amendments, he used the 
Dissent as a marker for the most extreme views espoused in 1788, 
not as guide to mainstream belief. Similarly, when William 
Findley, one of the signers of the Dissent, who had been among 
the most vocal Anti-Federalists in the Pennsylvania Convention, 
commented on the Dissent during the 1790s, he expressed surprise 
that anyone could seriously view it as a proper guide to anything. 
He was astonished that “the sentiments of a minority, acting 
under peculiar circumstance of irritation,” could be “quoted as a 
good authority for the true sense of the Constitution.”67 If the 
guiding maxim of public meaning originalism is the search for 
what the average reasonable user of English believed, it seems 
perverse that one would consider the Dissent a good choice for 
reconstructing such an understanding, but this is precisely what 
virtually every originalist, including Justice Scalia, has done.68 
MARX, BEARD, AND HELLER: ORIGINALISM AS 
CONSTITUTIONAL FARCE 
The absurdity of the claims made in Heller merit additional 
attention because they show how originalist theory produces an 
account of the past so distorted it borders on the surreal. 
Although not framed expressly in anti-Beardian terms, Scalia’s 
originalism takes issue with the central premise that has guided 
virtually all historical scholarship in the last century: the contested 
nature of Founding era constitutional culture. Scalia’s anti-
Beardianism is evidenced in a typically bombastic attack leveled 
against Justice Stevens. In his Heller dissent Stevens argued that 
the Court could not reconstruct the original meaning of the 
Second Amendment by looking at the language used in failed 
proposals such as the Dissent of the Minority, provisions that were 
never enacted into law and which were rejected by large 
majorities of Americans.69 Although Stevens did not feel the need 
to support such a common sense argument with an elaborate 
scholarly defense or a long list of citations, his argument echoes 
the dominant soft Beardianism embraced by historians for much 
of the last century.70 This claim drew a sharp rebuke from Justice 
Scalia: 
 67. William Findley, quoted in SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-
FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828, 225 (1999). 
 68. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 604 (2008). 
 69. Id. at 636–62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 70. R.B. Bernstein, Charles A. Beard: Foe of Originalism, 2 AM. POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 302 (2013); Slauter, supra note 2; Edling, supra note 1.  
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JUSTICE STEVENS’ view thus relies on the proposition, 
unsupported by any evidence, that different people of the 
founding period had vastly different conceptions of the right to 
keep and bear arms. That simply does not comport with our 
longstanding view that the Bill of Rights codified venerable, 
widely understood liberties.71 
It is not clear whose “longstanding view” Scalia is 
referencing. While some members of the Court have accepted a 
consensus vision of American history, this view has hardly been 
universal among members of the Court in recent years and has 
been rejected by Scalia himself in cases where it did not suit his 
ideological agenda.72 The consensus vision of the Founding era 
asserted in Heller was out of date the moment Beard published 
his influential work a hundred years ago. More than a century 
later, originalism’s vision of the past is even less creditable.73 
None of the originalist commentators who lavished attention 
on Whitehill’s list of Amendments, or the Dissent, including 
Justice Scalia, appear to have read and analyzed the full text they 
are so fond of quoting. If one examines Bryan’s text, it cuts against 
Scalia’s originalist interpretation of the Second Amendment.74 
The private uses of arms addressed in Whitehill’s amendments 
was not discussed in Bryan’s text, which focused exclusively on 
the danger of standing armies and the threats to the effectiveness 
of the militia. Bryan did include one brief mention of the threat 
the Constitution posed to Pennsylvania Quakers, one of several 
groups religiously scrupulous about bearing arms. Ironically, it 
was the right not to bear arms, not the right to bear arms that 
Bryan chose to highlight. Quakers were one of several groups in 
Pennsylvania who opposed bearing arms for religious reasons. A 
 71. Heller, 554 U.S. at 604–05. 
 72. Indeed, in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), Justice Scalia lambasted 
Justice Souter’s reliance on Hamilton’s authority, charging that his views were outside of 
the mainstream. Id. at 911–15. Apparently according to Justice Scalia’s ever shifting 
standards of proof, The Dissent of the Minority’s views are a good source for law, but 
Hamilton’s contribution to The Federalist is not. Printz provides a case where Justice Scalia 
appears to have adopted a very Stevens-like view of the disagreements within the 
Founding generation. Evaluating the impact of The Federalist is a complex historical 
question; the point is that Scalia’s yardstick for measuring the significance and impact of 
various Founding era sources depends largely on the outcome he desires in a particular 
case. On the historical impact of The Federalist, see Todd Estes, The Voices of Publius and 
the Strategies of Persuasion in The Federalist, 28 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 4, at 523–58 (2008). 
 73. See discussion supra at p. 387. For a trenchant historical critique of Scalia’s law 
office history in Printz, see Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional 
Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104 (2013). 
 74. Bryan’s arguments in the Dissent attracted far more attention in the press and 
relatively little comment was devoted to Whitehill’s amendments. See 15 DHRC at 7–13.  
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number of German sects, including the Mennonites, Moravians, 
and Dunkers, “peace churches,” all opposed bearing arms.75 
In Heller Justice Scalia invoked the authority of the Dissent, 
and claimed that its language provides powerful evidence that 
bearing arms was not generally understood to refer exclusively to 
military use. To arrive at this conclusion Scalia ignores Bryan’s 
contribution to the text, including his discussion of the Quakers. 
The meaning of Quaker opposition to arms bearing is addressed 
in another section of Heller, in the context of Madison’s original 
draft of the Second Amendment, which included language that 
exempted those scrupulous about bearing arms from militia 
service. In the House debate over the Amendment’s language, 
Massachusetts Anti-Federalist Elbridge Gerry moved that this 
clause be struck out. He worried that if the federal government 
had this authority it might use its ability to classify who was 
religiously scrupulous about arms bearing as a means to disarm 
the state militias.76 
Justice Scalia’s textualist originalism opposes the use of 
legislative history so it is not all that surprising that he does not 
accord much weight to the Congressional debate over the drafting 
of the Second Amendment, which included the decision to drop 
the clause on conscientious exemption.77 To refute the claim that 
“bearing arms” was most commonly understood to refer to the 
use of arms in a military context, Scalia does take up the case of 
the Quakers. In one of the weirdest arguments presented in 
Heller, Scalia asserts that Quaker opposition to arms bearing 
actually supports his individual rights reading of the Second 
Amendment. Members of the Religious Society of Friends, 
Quakers, opposed bearing arms, not because they were pacifists 
opposed to war, Scalia opines, but because of a more general 
opposition to violence, which led them to also reject “personal 
gunfights.”78 Elaborating on this point, Scalia notes, “Quakers 
opposed the use of arms not just for militia service, but for any 
 75. Richard K. MacMaster, Neither Whig Nor Tory: The Peace Churches in the 
American Revolution, 9 FIDES ET HISTORIA 8 (1977). Philip Hamburger, Religious 
Freedom in Philadelphia, 54 EMORY L.J. 1603 (2005). 
 76. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW (1998). For critiques of Scalia’s opposition to legislative history see Abner S. 
Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1919–22 (2006); Scott 
Soames, What Vagueness and Inconsistency Tell Us About Interpretation, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 31, 42 (Andrei Marmor & 
Scott Soames, eds., 2011). 
 77. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 590 (2008). 
 78. Id.  
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violent purpose whatsoever.”79 Of course terms such as “gun 
fighting” are themselves slightly anachronistic when applied to 
the eighteenth century. Pistols were relatively expensive and not 
particularly accurate in this early period, and the notion of 
Quaker duelists is just silly.80 As bizarre as this language seems, it 
does reflect a mythic version of American history, one filtered 
through the lens of the classic Hollywood westerns of Scalia’s 
youth.81 Two of those iconic westerns feature Quaker characters 
as dramatic foils to gunslingers. The most famous of these, High 
Noon, features Gary Cooper as Marshal Will Kane and his pacifist 
Quaker wife, Amy Fowler Kane, played by Grace Kelly.82 Scalia’s 
garbled version of Quaker theology misses a basic point about the 
beliefs and practices of eighteenth-century Friends. Quakers were 
not simply opposed to violence involving weapons, they were 
opposed to all forms of violence, including verbal assault. 
Quakers were also forbidden to curse or swear.83 Friends in 
Pennsylvania successfully created a “peaceable kingdom.” Within 
the tight-knit Quaker communities of this region there was 
remarkably little inter-personal violence of any kind. Quakers 
simply did not fight—guns or no guns.84 Scalia’s account conflates 
the vital distinction between bearing a gun, something many 
Quakers did, and bearing arms—something Quakers were 
prohibited from doing. Firearms were used by Friends for a 
variety of lawful purposes, but bearing arms was not one of them. 
The notion that Quakers were protesting against being forced to 
use privately owned guns for personal self-defense is just 
 79. Id. 
 80. See generally Sweeney, supra note 42; JACK D. & G.S. ROWE, TROUBLED 
EXPERIMENT: CRIME AND JUSTICE IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1682–1800 (2006). 
 81. Scalia has referenced the Westerns of his youth in the context of capital 
punishment; see Betsy Blaney, Scalia, Breyer Spar Over Capital Punishment, Judicial 
Philosophy, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 12, 2010, 10:42 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/12/scalia-breyer-spar-capital-punishment_n_783081.html. 
For an account of the “gun fighter” myth and modern Hollywood Westerns, see RICHARD 
SLOTKIN, REGENERATION THROUGH VIOLENCE: THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN 
FRONTIER, 1600–1860 (2000). 
 82. John Wayne’s Angel and the Badman and Gary Cooper and Grace Kelly’s High 
Noon are the two best examples. In Angel and the Badman, John Wayne plays a gun fighter 
who becomes involved with a family of Quakers and ultimately gives up his gun. ANGEL 
AND THE BADMAN (Republic Pictures 1947). In High Noon, Gary Cooper is saved by 
Grace Kelly, his Quaker wife, who rejects her faith’s nonviolence and takes up a gun to 
save her husband. HIGH NOON (United Artists 1952). 
 83. RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND CHRISTIAN ADVICES OF THE YEARLY MEETING OF 
FRIENDS FOR PENNSYLVANIA AND NEW JERSEY 99 (Philadelphia, 1797); THE REVISED 
DISCIPLINE APPROVED BY THE YEARLY MEETING OF FRIENDS HELD IN BALTIMORE 26 
(Baltimore, 1793). 
 84. See RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE 92 (2009); MARIETTA & ROWE, 
supra note 80 at 50.  
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ludicrous. Although Scalia seems to have taken his historical facts 
about Quakers from High Noon, he appears to have borrowed his 
legal logic in this section of Heller from the Marx Brothers. In 
Monkey Business, Groucho famously offers his services as both a 
bodyguard and attacker, a move that Groucho notes will cut costs 
and reduce the bottom line for both attacking and defending. In a 
moment of surreal Marxist logic, Groucho announces, “In case 
I’m gonna attack you, I’ll have to be there to defend you, too. Now 
let me know when you want to be attacked and I’ll be there ten 
minutes later to defend you.”85 Scalia’s reading of Quaker 
demands for a government exemption from having to arm and 
defend themselves is a bit like Groucho’s proposal. Government 
could not force Quakers to bear arms for personal self-defense. 
Indeed, this idea is so far-fetched it may even stretch the limits of 
Marxist logic—taking the High Court beyond Marxism into a 
Monty Python-esque realm of the absurd. Violence of any kind, 
not just gun violence, violated Quaker teaching and would have 
resulted in disciplinary action by the Monthly Meeting. The use 
of guns for self-defense may have posed a religious issue for 
Quakers, but it was not a legal problem requiring Quakers to 
petition their government for redress.86 Under Pennsylvania law, 
anyone, including Quakers, had a legal right of self-defense. One 
was free to exercise this right or not as conscience dictated. The 
same was not true of bearing arms in the militia. All 
Pennsylvanians were required to do this or pay a fine. There is 
absolutely no evidence that Pennsylvania had ever threatened to 
force Quakers to arm themselves for private defense.87 Until the 
middle of the eighteenth century the Quaker peace testimony was 
not generally interpreted by Friends to preclude support for 
secular authorities engaged in public defense. While Quakers did 
not bear arms, paying taxes used for public defense was not a 
violation of the Peace Testimony. This consensus eroded and was 
replaced by a more radical pacifist ideal which opposed support 
for any war-like behavior, including tax support for public 
defense.88 By the era of the American Revolution this prohibition 
 85. MONKEY BUSINESS (Paramount Pictures 1931). 
 86. For further discussion, see Cornell, supra note 5. 
 87. JANE E. CALVERT, QUAKER CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT OF JOHN DICKINSON (2009). 
 88. Quaker opposition to bearing arms remained fairly consistent during the 
eighteenth century, but attitudes toward indirect support for government military activities 
shifted over time. The French and Indian War was a decisive turning point in their 
evolution toward a more radical form of pacifism, one that rejected any support for war-
like actions. See Jack D. Marietta, Conscience, the Quaker Community, and the French and 
Indian War, 95 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 3 (1971); Hermann Wellenreuther, The  
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was extended beyond funds intended for the purchase of arms and 
ammunition, encompassing taxes to support the acquisition of 
such non-lethal military items as uniforms, tents, wagons, and 
drums.89 
If Scalia had simply read the full text of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, instead of quoting isolated snippets from it, he 
would have realized that a legal exemption from arms bearing 
requirements was not particularly controversial in Pennsylvania. 
The 1776 Declaration of Rights expressly recognized such an 
exemption.90 What was controversial in the Revolutionary era was 
the additional Quaker demand to be exempt from fines or taxes 
to support public defense.91 
Scalia avers that the words “bearing arms” could only be 
thought to have an exclusively military meaning if religious 
pacifists refused to carry guns in a military context but had no 
problem with their use in personal self-defense.92 This was 
precisely how other pacifists in Pennsylvania understood matters. 
The legal meaning of arms bearing and exemptions from this 
obligation in Pennsylvania becomes much clearer if one sets aside 
the extreme case of the Quakers and considers another pacifist 
group who refused to bear arms, the Moravians. In contrast to 
Quakers, Moravians had no objections to the use of arms for 
personal self-defense. During the French and Indian War 
Moravian communities in Pennsylvania were threatened by 
Indian attack. Religious leaders clarified their teachings on 
violence, affirming that the defensive use of arms was legitimate, 
even if bearing arms was still prohibited. When the issue of 
religious exemptions to arms bearing requirements came up 
during the American Revolution the Moravians naturally parted 
ways with Quakers. Unlike the Quakers who refused to pay taxes 
instead of service, Moravians believed that a secular government 
might wage just wars even if Moravians were prohibited from 
Quest for Harmony in a Turbulent World: The Principle of “Love and Unity” in Colonial 
Pennsylvania Politics, 107 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 537 (1983). 
 89. Wellenreuther, supra note 89. 
 90. PA. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, para. 13, reprinted in 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 78 (Philadelphia, 
1782). On the origins of the Pennsylvania arms bearing clause, see Kozuskanich, supra note 
63 at 1044–46. 
 91.  RULES OF DISCIPLINE, supra note 83. 
 92. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 589–90 (2008).  
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bearing arms in those conflicts.93 While Quakers protested, 
Moravians paid the tax required. 
THE UNREASONABLE SEARCH FOR THE 
REASONABLE MAN 
 Beard’s impact on legal scholarship, particularly 
constitutional theory, has been modest, especially when 
compared with his significant influence on historical scholarship 
over the last century. Yale Law School’s Akhil Amar’s treatment 
of Beard seems typical of the current views of many legal scholars: 
But—Charles Beard notwithstanding—the act of the 
constitution was not some antidemocratic, Thermidorian 
counterrevolution, akin to a coup d’etat, but was instead the 
most participatory and majoritarian event the planet had ever 
seen (and lawful to boot). Looking backwards from today, we 
see all the painful exclusions—of women, of slaves—but often 
miss the breadth of inclusion, looking backwards from 1787.94 
Amar correctly cautions against judging the Founders by 
modern standards of democracy. He is doubtless correct that 
Beard’s most immediate impact was on demonstrating that the 
Founders were not simply disinterested patriots virtuously setting 
aside their own economic welfare for the good of the nation. 
Judged from the perspective of modern historiography the 
counter-revolution thesis has not been the aspect of Beard’s 
analysis that has borne the most interesting historical fruit. It is 
the Libby/Beard account of the dynamics of ratification and the 
nature of Anti-Federalism that has had the most enduring impact 
on historical scholarship.95 
The most important theoretical division among 
contemporary academic originalists is not between liberals and 
conservatives, but rather the split between traditional 
intentionalists and proponents of some form of public meaning 
 93. Jared S. Burkholder, Neither “Kriegerisch” nor “Quäkerisch”: Moravians and the 
Question of Violence in Eighteenth-Century Pennsylvania, 12 J. MORAVIAN HIST. 143. 
 94. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment 
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 496 (1994) For another critical view of Beard, 
see Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 4 (1987). For another Progressive version of this claim, see J. ALLEN SMITH, THE 
SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN, 
INFLUENCE AND RELATION TO DEMOCRACY (1907). Chapter Three of Smith’s book was 
provocatively entitled, “The Constitution: A Reactionary Document.” 
 95.  See discussion supra p. 387.  
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originalism.96 Supporters of intentionalism continue to affirm that 
the proper focus of originalist inquiry is the discovery of original 
intent.97 This position has become increasingly marginalized in 
recent years. The ascendant paradigm among originalists is public 
meaning originalism. 98 
Most variants of public meaning originalism share a common 
assumption: the belief that focusing on some type of ideal fictive 
reader—sometimes described as a competent speaker of English 
or a fully informed reasonable reader—is the proper way to 
discover the original meaning of the Constitution.99 Randy 
Barnett describes the approach as follows: “[I]t is important for 
me to stress that the New Originalism seeks to identify what a 
reasonable speaker of English would have understood the words 
of the text to mean at the time of its enactment.”100 John McGinnis 
and Michael Rappaport frame the project in similar terms: 
“Theories of original public meaning, in contrast to original 
intent, interpret the Constitution according to how the words of 
the document would have been understood by a competent and 
reasonable speaker of the language at the time of the document’s 
enactment.”101 Gary Lawson’s summary of the role of such readers 
in new originalism seems especially apt: 
The reasonable American person of 1788 determines, for 1788 
and today, the meaning of the federal Constitution. Thus, when 
interpreting the Constitution, the touchstone is not the specific 
thoughts in the heads of any particular historical people—
 96. Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from 
Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2013) draw a distinction between 
New Originalism and neo-originalisms. Others scholars have also pointed out that the 
spread of theories claiming the mantel of “New Originalism” have proliferated to such a 
degree that the term may no longer have much value; James E. Fleming, The Inclusiveness 
of the New Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 433 (2013); Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice 
of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 749–55 (2011); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. 
Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 247–67 (2009); Peter J. Smith, How Different 
Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 722–24 (2011). In some 
accounts, scholars as different as Jack Balkin, Randy Barnett, and Keith Whittington are 
treated as New Originalists; see Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2013); Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of 
Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 413–31 (2013) and JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM 3–5 (2011). 
 97. For a defense of traditional intentionalism, see Larry Alexander, Originalism, the 
Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 540–41 (2013); Richard S. Kay, Original 
Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 
(2009). 
 98. Barnett, supra note 96; McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 4, at 761. 
 99. Solum, Heller and Originialism, supra note 16. 
 100. Barnett, supra note 96, at 415. 
 101. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 4, at 761.  
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whether drafters, ratifiers, or commentators, however 
distinguished and significant within the drafting and 
ratification process they may have been—but rather the 
hypothetical understandings of a reasonable person who is 
artificially constructed by lawyers. The thoughts of historical 
figures may be relevant to the ultimate inquiry, but the ultimate 
inquiry is legal.102 
The reasonable person originalists seek is not a neutral legal 
construct, but an ideological construction. New originalists invoke 
the ideal of empiricism, claiming to be interested in “facts about 
the world,” but on closer inspection there is little genuinely 
empirical about new originalist claims.103 In place of rigorous 
empirical research about how Americans actually understood the 
Constitution originalists have substituted the idea of the 
reasonable reader. Constructing such a reader would require an 
empirical methodology to deal with the multiple and conflicting 
intents of various authors and readers of the Constitution. Yet, 
new originalism emerged as a response to earlier critiques of 
intentionalist originalism, which failed precisely because they had 
no method to deal with this problem.104 The turn to philosophy of 
language did not solve the earlier problems with originalism; it has 
merely camouflaged them under a new philosophically inflected 
theoretical jargon. Dressing up new originalist theory in 
philosophical terms, particularly when the philosophy is so out of 
step with what philosophers of language have written about 
meaning and intention in the last twenty years, has done little 
more than create a new type of law office philosophy to justify the 
old law office history.105 
 102. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism As a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 47, 79 (2006) at 48; ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: 
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 355, 399–402 (2012). 
 103. Barnett, supra note 97. Solum, Heller and Originalism, supra note 16, at 946. 
 104. On law office history, see Matthew J. Festa, Applying a Usable Past: The Use of 
History in Law, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 479 (2008); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: 
An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119. 
 105. Solum and Barnett have invoked the authority of philosopher of language Paul 
Grice, but the version of Grice conjured up by these new originalists bears little 
relationship to Grice’s philosophy and his project of creating an intention based semantics 
and pragmatics. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989). Semantic 
originalism claims to be able to discern Gricean sentence meaning without addressing 
intent. This misreading of Grice means the entire project is actually parasitic on 
intentionalism without realizing it. For a critique of new originalism along these lines, see 
Larry Alexander, Constitutional Theories: A Taxonomy and (Implicit) Critique 23 (San 
Diego Legal Studies, Paper No. 13-120, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2277790. On Grice’s theory, see WILLIAM G. LYCAN, 
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 86–97 (2000); 
MICHAEL MORRIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 248–70  
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Although New Originalists often talk about discovering how 
the Constitution was read in 1788, most of the scholars associated 
with this paradigm seem unaware of the theoretical and 
methodological debates spawned by reader response literary 
criticism and the history of reading.106 The shift from imaginary 
readers to empirical studies of actual readers was driven by the 
simple realization that real readers seldom behaved in the manner 
that critics had envisioned. Fictive ideal readers invariably tended 
to mirror the ideological biases of the critics responsible for 
creating them.107 Ascertaining historical evidence of actual 
reading practices is notoriously difficult. In the case of the 
Constitution, a document that was both highly political and 
bitterly contested, the problems are even more intractable.108 
Should the fully informed reasonable reader we construct use 
Federalist interpretive practices or Anti-Federalist ones? If we 
choose a Federalist should our reader be Hamiltonian or 
Madisonian? Did the reasonable reader interpret the 
Constitution against background assumptions drawn from Anglo-
(2007). Philosopher Stephen Neale’s explication of Grice underscores the centrality of 
intention to his conception of sentence meaning: “[S]entence meaning (more broadly, 
utterance-type meaning) can be analysed (roughly) in terms of regularities over the 
intentions with which utterers produce those sentences on given occasions,” Stephen 
Neale, Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language, 15 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 509, 515 
(1992). By contrast, Solum claims “the sentence meaning (or ‘expression meaning’) of an 
utterance is the conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases that constitute 
the utterance,” Solum, Heller and Originalism, supra note 16, at 949. More recently, Solum 
has argued that “‘Public Meaning Originalism’ names the version of originalist theory 
holding that the communicative content of the constitutional text is fixed at the time of 
origin by the conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases in the context that 
was shared by the drafters, ratifiers, and citizens.” See Solum, Originalism and 
Constitutional Construction, supra note 16, at 459. The obvious problem with Solum’s 
formulation is that communicative content in Gricean terms can only be discerned by 
reference to speakers’ intentions, or in the case of sentence meaning, the patterns of 
intentionality corresponding to utterances in a particular linguistic community. Correctly 
construed, Grice’s theory could only lead to an intentionalist, not a semantic theory of 
orginalism; see Larry Alexander, supra note 97, at 540–41. 
 106. Literary scholars and historians have been writing about reading for more than 
twenty years. On the history of reader-response criticism, see generally Philip Goldstein, 
Reader-Response Theory and Criticism, in THE JOHNS HOPKINS GUIDE TO LITERARY 
THEORY AND CRITICISM 793 (Michael Groden et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005); Robert Darnton, 
History of Reading, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORICAL WRITING 140 (Peter Burke 
ed., 1991); Roger Chartier, Texts, Printings, Readings, in THE NEW CULTURAL HISTORY 
154–75 (Lynn Hunt ed., 1989). For a theoretical discussion of the implications of this 
method for intellectual history, see Martyn P. Thompson, Reception Theory and the 
Interpretation of Historical Meaning, 32 HIST. & THEORY 248 (1993). 
 107. On the need to study actual readers, see JANICE A. RADWAY, READING THE 
ROMANCE: WOMEN, PATRIARCHY, AND POPULAR LITERATURE (1984). 
 108. Some of the empirical problems of constructing actual histories of reading are 
discussed in Ian Jackson, Approaches to the History of Readers and Reading in Eighteenth-
Century Britain, 47 HIST. J. 1041 (2004).  
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American law or would the reasonable reader start with the 
assumption that the American Revolution marked a sharp break 
with English law?109 The significance of Beard’s original insight 
about the Constitution remains as important as ever: attitudes 
towards the Constitution in 1788 were determined, at least 
partially, by socio-economic interests and socio-cultural 
differences. The full range of American legal thought in the 
Founding era included a spectrum that ran from the artisan 
Benjamin Austin to the new nation’s most gifted legal theorist 
James Wilson.110 Austin gained most of his knowledge from the 
popular press. Wilson was a university educated lawyer who 
became a professor of law and a Supreme Court Justice. Both men 
were rational and competent users of English in 1788, but they 
interpreted the Constitution in radically different ways. Choosing 
one interpretive framework over the other is not a neutral 
exercise, but an inescapably political and philosophical one.111 
Given the contentious nature of Founding era legal culture it 
seems unreasonable to assume that one can identify a single set of 
assumptions and practices from which to construct an ideal 
reasonable reader who could serve as model for how to 
understand the Constitution in 1788.112 
In an important essay, philosopher Andrei Marmor has 
provided a useful reminder that many of the key ideas in legal and 
constitutional law are best understood as essentially contested 
concepts.113 The meaning of reasonableness in 1788 would depend 
 109. On the importance of this question to Founding era constitutional controversy, 
see Saul Cornell, supra note 10 at 324. 
 110.  On Austin, see Aaron T. Knapp, Law’s Revolution: Benjamin Austin and the 
Spirit of ‘86, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 271 (2013). For other discussions of anti-lawyer 
sentiment in the Founding era, see RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: 
COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 115 (1971); MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, 
AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876 (1976). 
 111. Ironically, using Wilson the better educated figure as our model would result in 
a jurisprudence most modern Americans would reject. It would require a repudiation of 
much modern First Amendment doctrine, see Cornell, supra note 5. 
 112. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 87 (2007). On interpretive pluralism in the 
Founding era, see Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 519 (2003). Nelson attempts to save the originalist project by asserting that by the 
Marshall Court era interpretive assumptions had become settled. The evidence for this 
aspect of Nelson’s erudite essay seems unpersuasive. There is no principled reason to claim 
that interpretive assumptions should be frozen in the Marshall Court era. Once we concede 
that new theoretical insights can bring about a better understanding of the original 
principles embedded in the Constitution, we must also conclude that each generation is 
able to engage in the same process of interpretation, see BALKIN, supra note 96. 
 113. Andrei Marmor, Meaning and Belief in Constitutional Interpretation, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 577 (2013).  
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in large measure on which sets of background assumptions one 
takes to be normative and which of several competing 
constitutional values one took to be foundational.114 By invoking 
a single unproblematic concept of reasonableness, when the 
concept was actually deeply contested, originalists can selectively 
pluck evidence from whatever source suits their particular 
ideological agenda and proclaim this to be identical to what a 
reasonable speaker of English would have believed. Such a 
pseudo-empirical methodology is little more than a constitutional 
shell game: an example of the old law office history dressed up in 
a new wrinkle-free set of eighteenth-century britches and a tri-
cornered hat. Using this approach one can take an idiosyncratic 
usage such as the Pennsylvania Dissent’s use of bearing arms and 
treat it as if it were evidence of what an imaginary reasonable 
reader of the Constitution actually believed. As the use of the 
Pennsylvania Dissent in Heller makes clear, one can transform a 
marginal or radical voice into a proxy for the objective public 
meaning of the Constitution. 115 
Gary Lawson is more forthright than many New Originalists 
when he concedes that the idea of an objective reasonable reader 
of the Constitution is a legal fiction. Although the “reasonable 
man” continues to play an important role in many areas of law, 
the concept has come under increasing criticism. 116 Even the most 
stalwart defenders of the utility of this concept concede that it is 
easily manipulated and often reflects ideological and cultural 
biases.117 The concept of the reasonable man in originalist theory 
 114. Marmor, supra note 13. Although New Originalists have tried to frame their 
enterprise in terms of interpretation and construction, such a dichotomy seems 
problematic. Founding era texts refer to theories of construction when discussing questions 
of interpretation, which makes the new originalist terminology inconsistent with Founding 
era language and usage; on this point, see BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 112, at 92–97. 
For a more general theoretical critique of New Originalism’s confusion of legal meaning 
with semantic meaning, see Berman & Toh, supra note 96. 
 115. As Marmor notes, “In short, general evaluative concepts are typically 
superpolysemous; such concept-words have a very wide semantic range, and they tend to 
designate different types of concerns, depending on context, background assumptions, the 
speaker’s intention, etc.,” Marmor, supra note 113, at 592. As Fleming notes, “the move 
within originalism from intention of the Framers to original public meaning is largely a 
public relations move—one that seems to acknowledge the flaws in the old originalism, yet 
to leave the actual practice of originalism unaffected,” Fleming, supra note 96, at 446. 
 116. Legal studies of gender have been particularly attuned to the cultural 
construction of reasonableness in gendered terms. These constructions are never neutral, 
Victoria Nourse, After the Reasonable Man: Getting Over the Subjectivity/Objectivity 
Question, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 33 (2008); Barbara Y. Welke, Unreasonable Women: 
Gender and the Law of Accidental Injury, 1870-1920, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 369 (1994). 
 117. For a useful overview of the importance and problems with this construction, see 
Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative  
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serves as a way to avoid dealing with the core methodological 
problem of orginalism: the absence of a sophisticated empirical 
methodology to deal with the contested nature of constitutional 
meaning in the Founding era. In this sense the practice of 
originalists is a bit like the joke about the economist trapped on 
an island with a cache of supplies in tin cans whose solution to the 
problem of opening them is to create a model that assumes the 
existence of a can opener. The construction of a reasonable 
person necessarily requires ideological choices on the part of the 
originalist interpreter.118 In practice these choices almost always 
match up with the ideological predilections of the originalist 
interpreter. In short, public meaning originalism is really an 
ideology, not a genuine scholarly methodology. 
Even if one were able to create the perfect hypothetical 
reader without any ideological bias such a reader would be an 
artificial construction and not a suitable basis for recovering the 
legal meaning of a document created and read by real eighteenth-
century Americans. Using a fictional constructed reader who 
never participated in the process of ratification as the basis for 
interpreting the Constitution, instead of the actual readers who 
approved the document and gave it legal effect at the time, makes 
a mockery of any pretense that originalism has any connection 
with democratic theory or any foundation in a theory of consent.119 
The notion of empirically investigating actual patterns of 
Founding era reading and interpretation and using these to 
promote a better understanding of the foundations of our 
constitutional system makes a good deal of sense. There is much 
to be learned from the Founding generation’s efforts to grapple 
with the implementation of the Constitution. 120 As a practical 
Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233 (2010). Moran accepts that the concept has 
been used to advance particular ideological agendas, but he nonetheless believes that the 
concept can be rehabilitated. 
 118. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are 
They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 5 (2011); Robert 
Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism As a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006). On originalism’s contemporary importance to political and 
ideological arguments about the Constitution in American politics, see Jamal Greene, 
Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009). 
 119. On the role of consent in originalist theories, see Barnett, supra note 97. 
 120. Originalist Randy Barnett seems confused by the widespread opposition of so 
many historians to originalism and the willingness of many of the same historians to sign 
amicus briefs, id. at 416. Part of Barnett’s confusion arises from a failure to distinguish 
between scholarship and advocacy. For an important discussion of this distinction, see 
William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 
1237 (1986). Historians writing scholarly articles are constrained by the norms of historical 
writing that aim at truth seeking. Historians participating in amicus briefs are engaged in  
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matter New Originalism’s emphasis on ideal readers and public 
meaning makes it too easy to manipulate evidence and churn out 
law office histories designed to justify almost any contemporary 
policy preference.121 Focusing on what actual historical actors said 
and believed has the advantage that one can hold originalists 
accountable to accepted historical standards of proof. The lesson 
from Heller seems clear: originalism places almost no meaningful 
restraints on judges and is an open invitation to judicial activism.122 
CONCLUSION: BEARD AND BEYOND 
A healthy dose of Beardianism seems essential to any 
sophisticated approach to understanding the original debate over 
the Constitution’s original meaning. Of course what may be 
salutary in moderate doses can easily prove harmful if taken in 
too large a dose.123 Beard urged Americans to recognize that the 
Constitution was born out of deep conflicts rooted in the socio-
economic divisions of eighteenth century American society. 
These tensions and divisions contributed to the emergence of 
radically different visions of what the Constitution meant in 1788 
and 1791. There is no need to embrace Beard’s materialism to 
appreciate the power of his insight. More than a hundred years 
after the publication of Beard’s pioneering work the time seems 
right for legal scholars to embrace a new constitutional historicism 
that acknowledges the true complexity of the original debate over 
the Constitution.124 
a legal process and governed by the norms of legal advocacy. The issues raised by such 
genre crossing have not been properly theorized by historians or legal scholars. For a 
thoughtful preliminary effort to begin such a process, see Joshua Stein, Note, Historians 
Before the Bench: Friends of the Court, Foes of Originalism, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 359 
(2013). Legal scholars are also divided over the connections between scholarship, 
advocacy, and amicus briefs. For two contrasting views of the proper role of legal scholars 
in amicus briefs, compare Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Scholars’ Briefs and the Vocation of a 
Law Professor, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 223 (2012), with Amanda Frost, In Defense of 
Scholars’ Briefs: A Response to Richard Fallon, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 135 (2013). 
 121. Kay, supra note 97. 
 122. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 
VA. L. REV. 253 (2009); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court 
and Gun Control, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 38–40; Charles Fried, The Second 
Annual Kennedy Lecture: On Judgment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1031 (2011). 
 123. Bernstein, supra note 70. 
 124. Meyler, supra note 14.  
 
